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Malson: Securities Arbitration

SECURITIES ARBITRATION:
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
BETWEEN SECURITIES BROKERS
AND THEIR CUSTOMERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Wilko v. Swan l declared the Supreme Court's unwillingness
to enforce predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising
from violations of the Securities Act of 1933,2 evidencing their
mistrust of the system of arbitration. s Over nearly four decades,
the holding of Wilko has been slowly eroded,· creating uncertainty as to the enforceability of arbitration agreements between
brokers and their clients. Now, however, arbitrating the disputes
that arise from the relationship between a securities broker and
their clients is no longer subject to uncertainty where there has
been a predispute agreement to arbitrate. In its recent decision
in Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express," the Supreme Court held that such agreements to arbitrate disputes
arising under the Securities Act of 1933 are enforceable, expressly overruling Wilko v. Swan. 6

This comment will explore the arbitration of securities disputes between securities brokers and their customers, showing
1. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
2. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm(1988».
3. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36. The Court stated "[the) effectiveness [of the Securities Act) in application is lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings." Id. See also, Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233
(1987).
4. For a discussion of cases that led up to the Supreme Court's overruling of Wilko,
see infra notes 36-67 and accompanying text. See also, Bedell & Bosch, The Rodriguez
Decision: A New Tradition In The Arbitration of Securities Disputes, 18 SEC. REG. L.J.
53 (1990); Malcolm & Segall, The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Section lO(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act: Should Wilko Be Extended?, 50 ALB. L.R. 725 (1986).
5. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
6. Id. at 1922.

405

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 7

406

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:405

that the investor today is fully protected in an arbitral forum
and that the advantages to the investor who arbitrates a claim
against their broker are expansive.
The comment will begin with a brief overview of the three
major components? which the courts have struggled with in an
effort to reconcile and harmonize with one another. The first
component is The Arbitration Act of 19258 which expressed the
legislature's intent to recognize and codify the viability of arbitration as an alternative to settling disputes in a forum other
than a judicial one. The other two components of this trilogy are
the Securities Act of 19339 and the Securities Exchange Act of
193410 which were intended to provide protection for buyers of
securities when dealing with sellers, with whom they may not be
dealing at arms length. l l From Wilko to Rodriguez De Quijas,
there is a rich judicial history which traces the evolution of arbitrating disputes between securities brokers and their clients,
showing the interrelationship of the three Acts, and the
problems that the court has had in trying to reconcile them.
The comment will then examine the actual predispute
agreements to arbitrate contained within customer agreements
and the extent of the claims that are covered, including Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act violations and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).I2 This
section of the comment will also look at how the standard defenses of fraud, duress, and misrepresentation affect predispute
arbitration agreements. IS
7. Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48
Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988)) and the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
See infra sec. II and notes 11-31.
8. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
9. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77mm (1988)).
10. 'Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291,48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988)).
11. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435. "While a buyer and seller of securities, under some
circumstances, may deal at arms's length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities
Act was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor." [d. at 435.
12. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964
(1988).
13. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
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The comment will conclude that with the uncertainty of the
enforceability of arbitration clauses contained within customer
agreements resolved,14 the advantages of arbitration will outweigh the disadvantages and provide for more adequate and efficient resolution of disputes between securities brokers and their
clients. In Rodriguez De Quijas, the Supreme Court correctly
recognized the important advantages of arbitrating securities
disputes between brokers and their clients,15 and thereby finally
recognized and harmonized the legislative schemes of the Securities Acts and the Arbitration Act.
II.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A.

THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

OF 1925

Understanding the motivation and intent of the legislature
in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act of 192516 (FAA) is essential in order to see how and why the courts finally overruled the
incorrect decision of Wilko.17 Congress clearly saw the need to
put arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs. illS In acting on this need, Congress evidenced its primary intent in passing the statute, to enable persons to enforce agreements to arbitrate to which they are a
party.19 Congress was also aware of the many benefits that would
accompany the passage of the FAA,20 including saving the time
and expense involved in litigation, realizing that the FAA would
alleviate some of these problems. 21
14. See Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
15. See infra notes 100-122 and accompanying text.
16. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924)); see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
17. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922 (1989). The Court stated: "We now conclude that
Wilko was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other federal statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of business
transactions." [d. See also infra note 66.
18. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219 (1985) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 1924)).
19. [d. at 220. The court in Byrd also rejected the suggestion that the overriding
goal of the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims, noting
that the "purpose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately
made agreements to arbitrate". [d. at 219.
20. [d. at 220.
21. The House Report observed: "It is practically appropriate that the action should
be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of
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Regardless of what Congress envisioned and intended in the
passage of the FAA, the court in Wilko displayed suspicion of
the arbitration process as "a method of weakening the protections afforded by the substantive law to would be complaintents. . . . "22 After Wilko, this "old judicial hostility to arbitration"23 began to disappear, the mistrust of arbitration as an
alternative form of dispute resolution eroded, and the courts began adhering to the legislative intent of the FAA. The courts
began to recognize the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements"2' and subsequently declared that it must "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate."21i Thus, a trend of
favoring the enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements
in securities disputes began gaining momentum soon after Wilko
was decided and has continued up through Rodriguez.
With their rigorous enforcement of the spirit and intent ot
the FAA, the courts have remained faithful to Congress's mandate by restraining hostile impulses against the arbitration of securities disputes and enforcement of predispute agreements to
arbitrate. 26
B. THE SECURITIES ACT OF
ACT OF 1934

1933

AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE

Congress saw the need to pass legislation, in the wake of the
stock market crash in 1929 and an ailing economy, that would
afford protections to investors and assist in healing this country's troubled and depressed economy.27 They passed the Securilitigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements made valid and enforceable." HR REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2
(1924).
22. Rodriguez De Quijas, 109 S. Ct at 1920. "[Wilko's suspicion of arbitration) has
fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes." Id.
23. Rodriguez De Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920, quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942).
24. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. at
24; see also supra note' 11.
25. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221.
26. See e.g., Rodriguez De Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920; Securities Industry Assn. v.
Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989).
27. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) ("[T)he Act emerged as
part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929 ... Congress' primary contemplation
was that regulation of the securities markets might help set the economy on the road to
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.ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
hopes of accomplishing these ends. 28
The purposes of the two Acts were to prevent fraud in the
interstate offer or sale of securities,2e heal the economy,80 require
securities dealers to fully disclose transactional information, and
to protect against market manipulation. 81 The two acts were
meant to be complimentary of each other and the courts have
tried to construe them harmoniously.82
Each Act contains a major provision which constitutes the
majority of claims that are involved in disputes between brokers
and their clients. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act88 requires
the full disclosure of material information concerning the offer
or sales of securities by a broker, providing investors with a remedy for any violation of this section.
recovery."); See also Malcolm & Segall, The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: Should Wilko Be Extended?, 50 ALB. L.REV.
725 (1987).
28. See supra notes 2 and 11.
29. See S. REP. No. 47. 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). "The purpose of this bill is to
protect the investing public and honest business. . . . The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and worthless securities
through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true information before the investor;
to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion; to
restore the confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities;
to bring into productive channels of industry and development capital which has grown
timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying
and consuming power." [d.
30. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979)(referring to the remarks
made by Reps. Kelly and Chapman and Sen. Norbeck in 77 CONGo REC. at 2925, 2935,
and 3232 (1933)).
31. See Ernst & Ernst V. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("The 1934 Act was
intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through
regulation of stock transactions... "); See also Note, Mixed Arbitrable and Nonarbitrable Claims in Securities Litigation: Dean Witter Reynolds V. Byrd, 34 CATH. U.L.REV.
525, 533 n.52 (1985).
32. Rodriguez De Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1922. The Court stated that: "[T]he 1933 and
1934 Acts should be construed harmoniously because they constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities." [d. quoting
in part Ernst & Ernst V. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976). The Court further stated
that: "[T]he inconsistency between Wilko and McMahon undermines the essential rationale for a harmonious construction of the two statutes (1933 and 1934 Acts), which is
to discourage litigants from manipulating their allegations merely to cast their claims
under one of the securities laws rather than another." Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922.
33. Securities Act of 1933 section 12(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. section 771 (1985)).
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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act34 is broad in
its scope. Essentially, it is an anti-fraud provision that not only
covers misrepresentation and omissions, but also failure to disclose and false statements made to buyers of securities. 311
C.

THE COURT'S BATTLE WITH RECONCILING THE THREE ACTS

The Supreme Court found that the two policies expressed
by the Securities Acts and the Arbitration Act were seemingly at
odds with each other. On the one hand, the Arbitration Act provided a means for "prompt, economical, and adequate solution
of controversies through arbitration . . . . "38 While on the other
hand, Congress sought to protect the rights of investors with
their passage of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, forbidding
waiver of any of those rights.87
Commentators and the Court have recognized the tension
that has existed between the Federal Arbitration Act and the
Securities Acts. 38
Wilko v. Swan 39 provided the Supreme Court with its first
opportunity to try and reconcile and harmonize the Federal Arbitration Act and the Securities Act of 1933. The court in Wilko
was faced with deciding whether or not a claim brought under
34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section lO(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988))
and S.E.C. Rule lO(b)(5) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.105-b (1989)).
35. See S.E.C. Rule IOb(5) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1989)). The S.E.C.
enacted Rule 10b(5) pursuant to the power it has under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, which created the S.E.C. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(l) (1982). Rule 10b(5) provides in
part: "It shall be unlawful for any person ... to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
36. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
37. [d.
38. See Malcolm & Segall, supra note 4 at 726 (conflict between the two policies
creates the problem addressed by the article).
39. In Wilko, an investor brought suit against an investment firm claiming that they
had falsely represented the value of some stock that was purchased. The investor
brought his claim under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. A contract between
the investment firm and the customer contained an agreement to arbitrate. The investment firm sought to stay the trial pending arbitration. The district court denied the stay
and the Court of appeals reversed the district court. See Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss2/7

6

Malson: Securities Arbitration

1991]

SECURITIES ARBITRATION

411

section 12(2) of the Securities Act by an investor was arbitrable
where a valid agreement had been signed to do so. The court
stated that section 14 of the Securities Act, which voids any
agreement or stipulation waiving any provision of the Act,40 prevented the enforcement of predispute agreements to arbitrate.
In its decision, the court declared that pre dispute agreements to
arbitrate claims arising under Securities Act section 12(2) were
not enforceable. 41
In its analysis, the court felt' that the congressional purpose42 and mandate of the Securities Act overrode those contained in the Federal Arbitration Act. n Clearly, the court felt
that the arbitral system, as it existed in 1953, was inadequate to
sufficiently protect investors.44 In light of these perceived inadequacies,4C1 the court felt that 12(2) claims "require the exercise of
judicial direction to fairly assure their effectiveness. "46
In post-Wilko decisions, the Supreme Court was again faced
with trying to reconcile conflicts between the Securities Act, Exchange Act, and the Arbitration Act. In Scherk v. Alberto Culver,47 the enforcement of an arbitration clause was at issue for a
claimed violation of section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act. The arbitration clause was contained in an agreement be40. Securities Act of 1933 § 14. Section 14 states that "any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."
15 U.S.C. § 77n.
41. Wilko, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The court in Wilko limited its holding to agreements
made prior to the existence of a controversy. See id. at 438 (Jackson, J., concurring). The
courts have uniformly held that Wilko doesn't apply to agreements to arbitrate existing
disputes. See e.g., Tullis v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 551 F.2d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 1977); Coenen
v. RW. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949
(1972); Gardner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 433 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1970).
42. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
43. 346 U.S. at 438.
44. The court in Wilko discussed a number of these inadequacies. The Court expressed concern over the fact that arbitrators must make legal determinations "without
judicial instruction on the law" and that the award can be made without a recorded
reason. Thus, judicial review for error in the arbitrators decision would be virtually nonexistent. The court also felt that arbitration was unsuitable for cases requiring "subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged violator". See 346 U.S. at 43537; see also McMahon 482 U.S. at 231.
45. [d.
46. 346 U.S. at 437.
47. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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tween an American company and a German company.48 In deciding whether or not the agreement to arbitrate should be enforced the Court looked to the particular circumstances of the
case. 49 Important to their decision was the fact that the contract
in question was truly international in context, involving an
American corporation, a German citizen, and the sales of businesses organized under the laws of European countries. lIo In light
of the international commercial contextll1 of the agreement, the
court upheld the predispute agreement to arbitrate. liZ The court
made a strong suggestion that Wilko might n'ot be applicable to
claims arising under the 1934 Act. lls
The Supreme Court was again confronted with the arbitrability of section 'lO(b) claims in Dean Witter Reynolds v.
Byrd ll4 and the arbitrability of federal antitrust claims in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth. 1I11 The issue before the court
in Byrd was whether or not arbitration should be compelled
where both section lO(b) and pendant state law claims were involved. 1I6 The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower courts,
ruled affirmatively on this issue, relying on the language and the
legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act. 1I7 The Court
stated that where a case contains both arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims, arbitration of the pendant arbitrable claims must
48.Id.
49. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
50.Id.
51. The court in Scherk placed a great emphasis on the fact that the case was in an
international setting. The court felt that a failure to uphold the agreement "would surely
damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and
ability of businessmen to enter into international agreement." Id. at 516. See also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 255, n.ll (JustiCe Blackmun concurring and dissenting with Justices
Brennan and Marshall).
52. See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20.
53. The court stated: "A colorable argument could be made that even the semantic
reasoning of the Wilko opinion does not control the case before us. There is no statutory
counterpart of section 12(2) in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and neither section
10(b) ... nor Rule 10 b-5 speaks of a private remedy.... " Id. at 513.
54. Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
55. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
56. See Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 215.
57. Id. at 218. The Court, in determining whether the District Court should compel
arbitration, looked to the Arbitration Act's language ("[Ilnsofar as the language of the
Act guides our disposition of this case, we would conclude that agreements to arbitrate
must be enforced.... ") and the Act's legislative history ("The legislative history of the
Act establishes that the purpose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of
privately made agreements to arbitrate.") Id. at 219.
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be compelled, ". . . even where the result would be the possibly
inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums."GB Although the court did not rule directly on the applicability of Wilko to Exchange Act claims, the decision did provide
further support for the enforcement of predispute agreements to
arbitrate.
In Mitsubishi,G9 the arbitrability of a claim under federal
antitrust law in an international commercial setting was at issue. 60 The Court reasoned that a bifurcated process was necessary in determining whether or not arbitration clauses should be
enforced. 61 The first step was to determine if the agreement encompassed statutory issues and secondly, consider whether any
legal constraints, external to the agreement of the parties, prohibited the arbitration of those issues.82 The court again displayed its strong support of the FAA citing that "[q]uestions of
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration.. "63
The decisions in Scherk, Byrd, and Mitsubishi led to the
inevitable decision by the Supreme Court in McMahon that
predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under section lO(b) of \
the Securities Exchange Act were enforceable. 6 ' The recent decision by the court in Rodriguez De Quijas u. Shearson/American
Express expressly overruled Wilko and declared that predispute
agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Act
58. [d. at 217. The Federal Courts of Appeals were divided on this issue. The 5th,
9th, and 11th circuits relied on the doctrine of "intertwining", whereby arbitrable and
non-arbitrable claims that are "sufficiently intertwined factually and legally" may be
tried together in a federal court, even when faced with a motion to compel the arbitration of the arbitrable claim. The 6th, 7th, and 8th circuits have held that the District
Courts do not have the discretion to deny a motion to compel arbitration where both
arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims are involved. [d. at 216-17.
59. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614.
60. A car manufacturer (Mitsubishi) brought suit against a car dealer (Soler) for a
variety of claims arising out of an alleged breach of a sales agreement between the parties. The agreement contained a clause that provided for arbitration of any disputes
before the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association. Soler counterclaimed asserting,
inter alia, antitrust violations. The District Court ordered arbitration of the antitrust
claims, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Scherk. The Court of Appeals reversed
insofar as the District Court's order to arbitrate the antitrust claims.
61. [d. at 628.
62. [d.

63. [d. at 626, citing Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
64. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
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were enforceable. 86 Thus the court has finally declared that
Wilko was incorrectly decided 88 and has fully recognized that
the system of arbitration is adequate to ensure the purpose and
intent of the Securities Act and Exchange Act as set forth by the
Congress. 87
III. THE PREDISPUTE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE:
CLAIMS THAT ARE COVERED AND THE EXTENT OF
ENFORCEMENT
A.

TYPICAL ARBITRATION CLAUSES

A customer desiring to transact business with a securities
broker88 today has a number of choices when making their selection. There are full service brokers and discount brokers, both of
whom provide a variety of services. The full service brokerage
house usually assigns an individual to the customer who becomes the investor's personal account executive. Upon the formation of this relationship, customers are typically asked to sign
a customer agreement form which will contain information
about the investor such as their financial status, investment
goals, and experience in investing and dealing in the securities
market. Additionally, the nature and extent of the relationship
with the broker that the investor can expect89 is usually
explained.
Along with the rules and regulations governing the relationship, the customer agreement forms will often contain an arbi65. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922.
66. In concluding that Wilko was incorrectly decided, the Supreme Court stated the
purpose of such a ruling: "Although we are normally and properly reluctant to overturn
our decisions construing statutes, we have done so to achieve a uniform interpretation of
similar statutory language, [citations omitted] and to correct a seriously erroneous interpretation of statutory language that would undermine congressional policy as expressed
in other legislation [citations omitted]. Both purposes would be served here by overruling the Wilko decision." [d. at 1922.
67. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233; see also supra note 16.
68. In this article, a securities broker will also be referred to as a "broker" or "stock
broker". For the purposes and scope of this article, the brokers referred to are primarily
those that handle retail customer accounts.
69. Customer agreements vary as to their content depending on the broker and the
type of account that is involved. Typically, brokers will have different types of agreements depending on whether it is a cash, margin, or option account. This is especially
true with respect to whether or not there is an arbitration clause contained within it. See
infra note 120.
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tration clause. The typical arbitration clause contains language
to the effect that "any controversy arising out of the broker/client relationship be settled by arbitration."70 The clause may
specify the arbitral forum and the rules which will govern the
process, often letting the customer choose from the forums listed
in the agreement. 71
The arbitration clause contained in a customer agreement is
now more that just "boilerplate" language. 72 The language of the
clause must be highlighted by distinguishable type, in outline
form, and noticeable to the customer.7S Additionally, the language of the clause must inform the customer that they, by signing the agreement, will be waiving their rights to court
remedies. 74
Recently, the Court of Appeals of New York ruled that absent an express writing limiting the arbitrable forum, a customer
may elect to arbitrate their claim before the American Arbitration Association (AAA) instead of one of the securities industry
sponsored forums.7Ii This ability of a customer to elect to arbitrate their claim before the AAA came about as a result of how
the customer agreement was worded with respect to arbitrating
future disputes. 78

70. Typical arbitration clauses in retail customer agreements may also include which
disputes may be arbitrated and may also contain where and under whose rules arbitration will occur.
71. Forums available for arbitration include the systems available under the Self
Regulatory Organizations (SRO's), the American Arbitration Association, and perhaps
private judging.
72. See generally Adams v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 888 F.2d
696 (10th Cir. 1989) (customer claims of a customer agreement as being a form, boilerplate contract).
73. See S.E.C. order, infra note 101 at 21153.
74. [d.
75. Cowen & Co. v. Anderson, 76 N.Y.2d 318 (1990). See also infra note 101 and
accompanying text.
76. The customer agreement in Cowen provided for arbitration in "accordance with
the rules then in effect" at a number of the SRO's. Under the rules of the AMEX's
constitution (often referred to as the AMEX Window), AAA arbitration was permitted.
For a discussion of the "AMEX Window" and its ramifications see Franklin, Amex Window Debate; Cowen Renews Struggle over Arbitration Forums, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1990 at
5.
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ARBITRABLE CLAIMS

As indicated in the previous section, typical arbitration
clauses usually do not specify exactly which type of controversies between the customer and the broker that will be arbitrable.
"Any controversy" is a broad area. 77 The anti-fraud provisions
contained in section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act are by far the most
common claims brought by customers against brokers. 78 The Supreme Court has indicated that the arbitration system as it exists today is fully capable of addressing those claims where there
has been an agreement to do SO.79 Any question about the enforceability of arbitration agreements where sections 12(2) and
10(b) are claimed, have been answered affirmatively.80
Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act claims are not
the only claims that have been brought against brokers where
questions of arbitration have arose. The Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act81 (RICO) is another claim which
clients have leveled against their brokers. RICO's main advantage to the customer when asserting a claim against their broker
is the treble damage provision contained in section 1964(c).82
Prior to Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,83 civil
RICO claims concerning securities disputes were generally not
held subject to arbitration. 8' The court in McMahon, in address77. Brokerage firms in-house resolution procedures vary, but all have internal methods of dealing with disputes that may arise between brokers and their clients.
78. See e.g., Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1917 (1989); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
79. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233 (the expansive power of the S.E.C. to ensure the
adequacy of the arbitration procedures of the SRO's); see also supra notes 66-67 and
accompanying text and supra note 16.
80. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922 (1989); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238 (1987).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
82. [d.; see also McMahon at 241, quoting Representative Steiger about the remedial purpose of the provision: "It is the intent of this body, I am certain, to see that
innocent parties who are the victims of organized crime have a right to obtain proper
redress..." [d. at 240. The court also noted that "the treble-damages cause of action ... seeks primarily to enable an injured competitor to gain compensation for that
injury." The court was displaying the importance of the treble-damages provision of § 4
of the Clayton Act and analogizing its legislative intent to that of the RICO statute. [d.
at 240.
83. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
84. See e.g., Page v. Moseley, Ha11garten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. 806 F.2d 291,
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ing the RICO claim brought by an investor, relied heavily on
their decision in Mitsubishi. 8D By looking at the legislative text
and history of the statute, the court determined that there was
nothing contained in it that evidenced a Congressional intent to
exclude civil RICO claims from the "dictates of the Arbitration
Act."8s The major arguments presented to the court in McMahon which would preclude the submission of civil RICO claims
to arbitration included the complexity of the RICO claim,87 the
overlap of criminal and civil provisions, and the public interest
involved in RICO enforcement. 88 These arguments were dismissed by the court declaring that the RICO claims could effectively be vindicated in an arbitral forum. 89
C.

ATTEMPTS

To

CIRCUMVENT ARBITRATION

Section 2 of the Arbitration Act declares that as a matter of
federal law, arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."90 Defenses available
to the investor seeking to keep their claim out of the arbitration
process will become increasingly more difficult to assert. In the
past, investors have claimed that the arbitration clauses contained within customer agreements were obtained by fraud, or
that the contracts themselves were adhesive. 91
298 (1st Cir. 1986) (" ...we believe the Congressional intent [of RICO] to have been one
of precluding arbitration... "); Tashea v. Bache, Halsey, Stuarts, Shields, Inc., 802 F.2d
1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that RICO claims based on violations of the 1933
and 1934 Acts are not subject to compelled arbitration); Jacobson v. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 797 F.2d 1197, 1202 (3d Cir. 1986) RICO claims based on 10b-5
violations not subject to arbitration).
85. See McMahon 482 U.S. at 239-41.
86. Id. at 242.
87. Id. at 239. The Court responded to this argument by relying on its decision in
Mitsubishi where it stated that "potential complexity should not suffice to ward off arbitration." Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S.
at 633). The Court further stated that antitrust matters are "every bit as complex as
RICO claims", that the arbitral system's "adaptability and access to expertise" could
handle complex claims, id., and that "arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling
the factual and legal complexities. . . . " Id. at 232.
88. Id. at 239-41.
89. Id. at 242. The court stated that the "McMahons may effectively vindicate their
RICO claim in an arbitral forum . . . . "
90. Id. at 226 quoting section 2 of the F.A.A., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
91. See Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 109 S. Ct. at 1921
(1989) (record devoid of facts supporting agreement to arbitrate as adhesive); Cohen v.
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Claims by investors that they were fraudulently induced to
sign or misled as to the effect of signing a customer agreement
that contains' an arbitration clause usually fail to keep a claim
from being arbitrated. 92 It is well established that general attacks on the entire customer agreement as being fraudulently induced are subject to arbitration. 9s Specific attacks on the arbitration clause itself could conceivably permit court adjudication
of these issues. 9• Allegations of fraud as they relate to the clause
itself will not necessarily allow the dispute to enter into a judicial forum. 911 A broker that fails to inform the client as to the
existence and effect of the clause has not committed actionable
fraud unless there is a duty to disclose. 98 Since a broker does not
have a duty to disclose or explain an arbitration clause contained within a customer agreement,97 claims of fraud as they
relate to the clause itself will also fail.
Asserting that the arbitration clause is a part of a contract
Wed bush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988) (claim of fraud for failure to
disclose effect of arbitration clause).
92. See Bitkowski v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 866 F.2d 821 (6th Cir.
1988)(broker did not conceal nor discuss the contents of the customer agreement); Russo
v. Simmons, 723 F. Supp. 220,224 (S.D. N.Y. 1989)(customer claim of fraudulent inducement to be decided by arbitrator).
93. Curtis v. Newhard, Cook & Co., Inc., 725 F.Supp 1072, 1074 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
See e.g., Cohen v. Wed bush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1988); Villa
Garcia v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 833 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1987);
Bhatia v. Johnston, 818 F.2d 418, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1987); Benoay v. Prudential-Bache
Sec. Inc., 805 F.2d 1437, 1441 (llth Cir. 1986).
94. Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 403-4 (1967). The Court
explained that if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, an
issue which goes to the "making" of the agreement to arbitrate, the federal court may
proceed to adjudicate it. [d.
95. See Cohen, 841 F.2d at 286-87. The customer contended that Wedbush's failure
to inform them of the ramifications of the arbitration clause was not aimed at the entire
contract but only on their assent to the arbitration clause. The court stated that: "This
does not mean, however, that the Cohens are entitled to a jury trial. In order for a mere
omission to constitute actionable fraud, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that the defendant had a duty to disclose the fact at issue." [d. at 286-87.
96. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (failure to disclose is fraud
only when there is a duty to do so); Cohen, 841 F.2d at 287 (no duty to disclose or
explain terms of a written contract).
97. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 681 F.Supp 1045, 1052 (S.D. N.Y. 1988) (brokers
are not required as a matter of law to disclose or explain arbitration clauses); see also
Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696, 701 (lOth Cir. 1989)
(When an investor signs an agreement, the law presumes that one has read that which
one has signed); Pierson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984)
(failure by an investor to inquire about the effects of the arbitration clause can't be used
to avoid arbitration).
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of adhesion is also rarely successful in keeping claims out of
arbitration. 98
IV. ADVANTAGES OF ARBITRATION IN BROKER-CLIENT DISPUTES: THE ADEQUACY OF THE SYSTEM
A.

ADVANTAGES

OF

ARBITRATION

This section of the note will explore the positive effects and
advantages of the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez when a
dispute that arises between securities brokers and their clients is
arbitrated. Customers, effectively shut out of the courts after
signing an agreement that contains an arbitration clause, are
nonetheless still adequately protected as was intended by Congress when the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act
were passed. 99 The mistrust of the arbitration system as displayed by the court in Wilko has deteriorated to the point of
near non-existence 100 and the regulatory changes 101 that have
taken place since Wilko have cast doubt aside as to the effectiveness of arbitration.
98. See e.g., Rodriguez De Quijas, 109 S. Ct at 1921; Adams, 888 F.2d at 700; Cohen, 841 F.2d at 286; Surman v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61
(8th Cir. 1984) (rejection of argument that brokerage agreements were contracts of adhesion); Schuster v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 699 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (rejection of
argument that customer agreements were contracts of adhesion that were lacking mutuality of obligation).
99. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
100. See Rodriguez at 1920.
101. See, Self Regulatory Organizations; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes
by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
and the American Stock Exchange Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use
of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 Fed. Reg. 21144 (1989). This order approved a
number of changes filed by the SRO's with the S.E.C. in response to an S.E.C. letter to
the SICA which indicated a number of areas that arbitration reform might be necessary.
The areas of approved changes included:
1. Service of Pleadings
2. Classification of Arbitrators
3. Arbitrator Disclosure and Background Information to be disclosed to the Parties
4. Appointment of Replacement Arbitrators on Panel
5. Availability of Small Claims Procedures and the Number of Arbitrators Required
to Hear a Claim
6. Discovery
7. Preservation of Record
8. Content and Availability of Award
9. Arbitration Fees
10. Predispute Arbitration Clauses
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These rule changes were the result of actions by the
S.E.C.I02 which saw the need for changes in the current system
of arbitration and the rules regulating it. The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA)103 and the Self Regulatory
Organizations (SRO's)1°· have worked to ensure that the arbitration system is both fair and efficient. The obvious advantage
that will be enjoyed by the customer are the time and cost savings that will be realized by the submission of disputes to arbitration. lOIl Undoubtedly, these advantages will extend to the broker as well.
The greatest savings on costs will result from the reduced
time spent in settling a claim through arbitration as opposed to
litigation. loe This reduction in time is the direct result of expedited filing, discovery, and hearing procedures. lo7 This equates
into lesser legal costs as a percentage of arbitral awards. lOS
The fairness of the process of arbitration is another important advantage to the securities customer. The composition of
the arbitral panels are composed of a majority of individuals
who are not affiliated with the securities industry and a minority
102. See id., referring to the letter from Richard G. Ketchum, Director, Division of
Market Regulation, S.E.C. to JamesE. Buck, Senior Vice-President, New York Stock
Exchange Inc., dated September 10, 1987.
103. The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration is comprised of a representative from each of the self-regulatory organizations which administers an arbitration
program, a representative from the securities industry, and four public representatives.
104. The SRO's which have an arbitration program are the New York Stock Exchange, Pacific Stock Exchange, National Association of Securities Dealers, American
Stock Exchange, Chicago Board of Exchange, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board,
Boston Stock Exchange, Cincinnati Stock Exchange, and Philadelphia Stock Exchange.
105. See Note, Classwide Arbitration and JOb-5 Claims in the Wake of Shearson/
American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 391 (1989); See also
Fletcher, Learning to Live With the Federal Arbitration Act-Securities Litigation in a
Post-McMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99, 122 (1988).
.
106. See Note, Arbitration of Securities Disputes: Rodriguez and New Arbitration
Rules Leave Investors Holding a Mixed Bag, 65 IND. L.J. 697, 707 (1990) (599 days for
litigated claims and 434 days for arbitrated claims). But see Hayes & Hagedorn, Arbitration Saves Money, But Not Time, Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1990, at B7, col. 1 (referring to a
study by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice showing that arbitrated cases
took an average of 285 days and nonarbitrated cases 282 days).
107. See S.E.C. order, supra note 101 at 21145.
108. See Note supra note 106, appendix (letter from Deloitte Haskins & Sells to the
New York Stock Exchange (undated) showing that in a survey that it conducted, the
legal costs as a percentage of awards was 28.75% for arbitrated claims and 79.66% for
litigated claims).
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of those who are in some way connected with the industry.loe
Arbitrators are now subject to closer scrutiny as to their industry affiliations, both present and past, which goes far in assuring
that the investor will be adequately protected. llo The past practice of not keeping a record of the arbitration proceedings no
longer exists. l l l Arbitrators are now required to keep a record of
the proceedings and allow access to these records by each of the
parties. 112 Having a record of the proceedings will enable the
parties to more readily appeal an arbitral award by allowing a
court a means of reviewing the proceedings. 113
Perhaps the greatest advantage to the customer in the recent rule changes will result from the customer's heightened
awareness of knowing what arbitration is and how it will affect
them in the event that a dispute does arise in the broker-client
relationship. The highlighting of the arbitration clause and the
brief explanation of what it means 1l4 will put prudent investors
on notice so that they may arm themselves with the knowledge
necessary to make an informed decision.

B.

INVESTOR CHOICE

The Court of Appeals of New York decision in Cowen v.
Anderson lllS seems to suggest that a choice of forum, other than
those sponsored by the securities industry, will be available to
109. See S.E.C. order, supra note 101; see also Note, supra note 106, at 710.
110. See id., see also National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Code of Arbitration Procedure § 19 (1988).

111. S.E.C. order, supra note at 21151.
112. [d.

113. The standards used by a court in vacating an award are found in 9 U.S.C. § 10
(1982). They include in part:
1) Where the award was procured through corruption, fraud, or undue means.
2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators.
3) Arbitrator misconduct.
114. S.E.C. order, supra note 101 at 21153.
115. Cowen & Co. v. Anderson, 76 N.Y.2d 318 (1990). In Cowen, the customer, Anderson, sought to arbitrate a claim before the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in
accordance with the account agreements he had signed which contained clauses providing that disputes be settled through arbitration in accordance with the rules of the
NYSE, AMEX, or NASD. Cowen sought a stay of arbitration before the AAA contending
arbitration must take place in one of the three listed SRO's. The lower court denied the
stay and the Court of Appeals affirmed. It stated that under the rules of the AMEX, the
AAA is a forum in which an investor may seek arbitration unless there has been an
express agreement to limit the forum.
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investors. The American Arbitration Association 116 (AAA) is. one
such forum. It can provide for the resolution of disputes between
brokers and their customers in a setting away from the securities
industry.
The AAA has its own set of rules tailored especially for securities disputes. In 1987, the AAA issued Securities Arbitration
Rul es l17 (SAR) which, while similar to Commercial Arbitration
Rules, specifically address the special needs of securities disputes. 118 Since the SAR's were first published, there has been "a
positive user response [indicating] that AAA securities arbitration is perceived to offer a fair and impartial means of resolving
customer-broker disputes."119
Of course, the ultimate investor choice is whether or not to
enter into an agreement containing an arbitration clause. There
is nothing which mandates an arbitration clause in a customer
agreement with a broker other than each firm's decision to use
them. 120 There will always be brokers whose customer agreements do not contain arbitration clauses if there is a market for
such agreements. l2l However, as investors become more aware of
the advantages of arbitration as a means of settling disputes and
the perceived unfairness and bias of arbitration disappears,122
the predispute agreement to arbitrate claims will become more
commonplace.
116. Friedman, Arbitration 1989, Securities: The Latest Developments, 115 (1989).
The American Arbitration Association is a nationwide organization with a panel of over
50,000 qualified arbitrators. Approximately 1400 of these arbitrators are qualified to hear
securities disputes by either industry affiliation or by knowledge with no industry affiliation. [d. at 117.
117. American Arbitration Association, Securities Arbitration Rules (amended
1989).
118. See Friedman, AAA's New Securities Arbitration Rules, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 8,
1987, at 1, col. 1.
119. See Friedman, supra note 116 at 119.
120. A study by the S.E.C. indicated that only 39"10 of the brokerage firms had customer agreements that contained predispute arbitration clauses for cash accounts. However, the study also showed that customer agreements for margin and options accounts
did contain arbitration clauses. See S.E.C. Order, supra note 101 at 21153.
121. See S.E.C. Order supra note 101 at 21153. In the order, the S.E.C. stated that
it was "hopeful that competitive forces will result in some firms offering margin or options accounts without such [arbitration) agreements." But see Note, supra note 106 at
718.
122. See L.A. Times, Dec. 13,1987, part 4, at I, col. 4. "Many investors ... perceive
these arbitration systems as unfairly stacked in favor of brokers, in part because panels
are selected and administered by the securities industry."
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CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Wilko u. Swan, there
has been a continuous erosion of its holding, resulting in its
eventual demise. Subsequent decisions have highlighted the er-'
roneous holding of Wilko and recognized the advantages that arbitration affords the investor. Recognition of these advantages is
due in part to the regulatory changes within the established system of arbitration, the disappearance of "judicial hostility toward arbitration,"123 and the availability of alternative forums.
The rule changes in the arbitration system will heighten investors' awareness as to the effects of signing a customer agreement with a broker that contains an arbitration clause. Additionally, investors should take it upon themselves to become
more aware of the significance of having to arbitrate any dispute
that may arise from their relationship with their broker. Armed
with such knowledge, investors will recognize arbitration as a
fair and efficient means of resolving disputes with their brokers.
Gregory N. Malson*

123. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992.
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